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 Huw Price argues that there are two conceptions of the puzzle of the time-asymmetry of 
thermodynamics.  He thinks this puzzle has remained unsolved for so long partly due to a 
misunderstanding about which of these conceptions is the right one and what form a solution 
ought to take.  I argue that it is Price’s understanding of the problem which is mistaken.  Further, 
it is on the basis of this and other misunderstandings that he disparages a type of account which 
does, in fact, hold promise of a solution.    
 
The Problem 
 As Price emphasizes, we must first make sure to understand the problem before we can 
try to solve it.  So what is it that we find puzzling about thermodynamics? 
 The best way to get at the puzzle, it seems to me, is by means of the following 
observations.  In our experience, systems increase in entropy in the forwards direction of time:1 
ice cubes melt, coffee cools, gases expand to fill their containers.  The second law of 
thermodynamics, which says that the total entropy of the world (or of any isolated sub-system) 
never decreases, captures the time-directedness of these processes.  The question is where the 
time-asymmetry of this law comes from. 
                                                 
1 As Price notes, the issue of the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics is distinct from the question of whether there 
is an objective direction to time, and in particular whether one direction is objectively the forwards one.  For 
convenience, I refer to the ‘future direction of time’ and the ‘backwards direction of time’, where these should be 
understood as shorthand for ‘what we take to be the future direction of time’ and ‘what we take to be the backwards 
direction of time’ respectively. 
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 In the nineteenth century, the hope arose that thermodynamics could be reduced to, or in 
some sense grounded in, statistical mechanics.  But the Newtonian dynamical laws, which on 
this picture underlie thermodynamic behavior, are symmetric in time: according to Newtonian 
mechanics, whatever can happen forwards can also happen backwards.  As far as this time-
reversal invariant theory is concerned, there is no law-like difference between the past and the 
future.  The problem is that in our experience, certain processes just do not happen backwards: 
our experience suggests there is a law-like asymmetry between the past and the future.  And 
Newtonian mechanics, it seems, can not account for this asymmetry.  
We now know, of course, that Newtonian mechanics is not the fundamental theory of the 
world.  But it seems that no other serious candidate for such a theory will be of more help here, 
for these theories are similarly invariant under time reversal,2 and processes like the warming of 
coffee and the contraction of a gas to one corner of its container are consistent with these 
theories too.  Every one of these theories (with an exception to come) is therefore at odds with 
the time-asymmetry of our experience, just as Newtonian mechanics is.  
So the question remains: what grounds the asymmetry of the second law of 
thermodynamics?  Why does coffee cool and ice melt, if the underlying theory allows for the 
time-reversed processes to occur?  The problem, then, is to explain the time-asymmetry of 
thermodynamics, given that the underlying laws are symmetric in time. 
 
                                                 
2 The problem arises regardless of one’s particular view about what it is for a theory to be time reversal invariant.  
On the traditional notion, these theories are clearly invariant.  On an understanding of time-reversal invariance such 
as David Albert’s, these theories are invariant in at least a partial way—with respect to the positions of particles—
and so generate the same difficulty with respect to the asymmetry of thermodynamics.  (See Albert [2000], pp. 14-
16.) 
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Price’s Approach  
Thus, it seems that what we want explained, vis-à-vis the time-asymmetry of 
thermodynamics, is the fact that all of our experience appears confirmatory of a generalization to 
the effect that entropy never decreases.  Price concludes, however, that “the crux of the observed 
thermodynamic asymmetry is an existential or particular fact, concerning the nature of our 
universe early in its history” ([2002], p. 3).  On his view, the explanandum is not a generalization 
about the time-asymmetry of our experience.  Instead, the core explanatory issue is why the 
universe began in an extremely low-entropy state.  
Price espouses what he calls an “Acausal-Particular” view of the problem, which he 
contrasts with the “Causal-General” approach.  For the Generalist, the asymmetric explanandum 
of thermodynamics is a law-like generalization, e.g., that entropy never decreases.  A solution, 
on this picture, would explain the observed thermodynamic regularity, perhaps by locating a 
causal mechanism responsible for it.  The Particularist, on the other hand, takes the explanandum 
to be the obtaining of special initial conditions of the universe.  On this understanding, there is 
no time-asymmetric generalization to account for; a fortiori, there is no underlying causal 
mechanism which gives rise to it.   
Price claims to be advocating a Boltzmannian type of Acausal-Particular account.  Let us 
look more closely at his version of this solution.  Consider a vial of pressurized gas which is 
inside a larger container.  When the vial is opened, the gas expands to fill the container.  Price’s 
explanation of this process is the following: 
We consider what possible future ‘histories’ for the system are compatible with the initial 
set-up.  The key to the statistical approach is the idea that, under a plausible way of 
counting possibilities, almost all the available microstates compatible with the given 
initial macrostate give rise to future trajectories in which the gas expands.  It is 
possible—both physically possible, given the laws of mechanics, and epistemically 
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possible, given what we know—that the actual microstate is one of the rare ‘abnormal’ 
states such that the gas stays confined to the pressurised vial.  But in view of the vast 
numerical imbalance between abnormal and normal states, the behaviour we actually 
observe is ‘typical’, and therefore calls for no further explanation ([2002], pp. 12-13). 
  
As Price notes, according to Boltzmannian statistical considerations, entropy increase is 
overwhelmingly likely.  The Boltzmannian approach thus yields what Price calls a ‘normalizing 
explanation’ according to which entropy increase is ‘typical’: no explanation for the observed 
thermodynamic regularity is needed over and above an appeal to its statistical normality.  As he 
writes in his book, Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point, ‘things are more in need of explanation 
the more they depart from their natural conditions’ ([1996], p. 39); and Boltzmannian statistics 
have shown entropy increase to be the ‘normal behaviour of matter’ ([2002], p. 15).  For Price, 
then, the fact that the natural measure over microstates deems entropy increase unexceptional—
by counting the number of normal microstates as overwhelmingly large—means that this 
behavior is not in need of explanation beyond that offered by these statistical considerations. 
Since Boltzmannian statistical considerations have explained the second law of 
thermodynamics, this generalization, on Price’s view, is not the explanandum we have in mind 
when it comes to the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics.  The real puzzle, says Price, is why 
the universe was ever out of equilibrium in the first place, given that equilibrium is the most 
probable or normal condition for a system to be in.  The initial low-entropy condition of the 
universe, in other words, is statistically abnormal and therefore in need of explanation.  So the 
puzzle about the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics is not, ‘Why does entropy increase?’, as 
we may have thought, but rather, ‘Why isn’t entropy high almost everywhere, almost all the 
time?’ ([2002], p. 13).  Price concludes that all we need in order to explain thermodynamic 
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asymmetry is an explanation of the initial condition of the universe—plus the ‘normalising 
explanation’ that otherwise, the thermodynamic behavior we observe is unexceptional.  
Armed with this understanding of the problem, Price argues that the Causal-General 
approach is doomed to failure.  In positing a causal mechanism responsible for entropy increase, 
this kind of account is committed to the claim that if it were not for that mechanism, things 
would not behave as we now observe them to behave thermodynamically.  More specifically, the 
Causal-Generalist is committed to the claim that, ‘If it were not for the mechanism M, the system 
in question would occupy an “abnormal” (entropy-reducing) microstate’ ([2002], p. 29).   
Price thinks that this counterfactual is unjustified.  He argues that the Generalist has no 
reason to assume that if the proposed mechanism suddenly failed, the evolution of 
thermodynamic features would be any different from what we now observe them to be: just 
because there is no causal mechanism driving entropy increase does not mean that a system will 
exhibit abnormal behavior.  In fact, Price maintains, we should assume the opposite.  For ‘our 
only guides as to what to expect in the imagined counterfactual situation are our epistemic 
probabilities’ ([2002], p. 29).  And the natural epistemic measure counts normal thermodynamic 
behavior as overwhelmingly likely.  Therefore, once the Boltzmannian statistical considerations 
are in place, there is no work left for a causal mechanism to do: since the natural measure always 
leads us to expect entropy-increasing behavior, it seems that no account can satisfy the kind of 
counterfactual it must satisfy in order to succeed in locating a cause of such behavior.  Price 
concludes that the Causal-Generalist misconceives the problem, construing the puzzle as the 
question of why entropy increases when the real puzzle is why the universe ever began in its 
low-entropy condition in the first place.   
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Problems with Price’s View 
Price, however, reaches these conclusions on the basis of some misunderstandings.  First 
of all, he misconstrues the argument behind the Causal-General approach, and in so doing 
renders his own objections irrelevant.  Price represents the Causal-Generalist as thinking that we 
need to find a mechanism which forces entropy to increase towards the future in order to be able 
to explain this behavior.  Although this might accurately describe what some General theories 
look like, it is misleading as a conception of what motivates these views.  For the Generalist is 
not after a causal mechanism per se.  The goal, after all, is to account for thermodynamics.  And 
since the Boltzmannian story does manage to do this, the Generalist’s argument can not be that 
this solution is deficient in failing to identify some mechanism responsible for normal 
thermodynamic behavior.  Rather, the argument must be that a Causal-General theory can 
account for thermodynamics better than the Boltzmannian one.  Price’s attack on the causal 
commitments of General views is therefore beside the point, for it does not address the issue of 
whether such a theory can account for thermodynamics. 
Consider an example of a Causal-General account recently proposed by David Albert in 
his book Time and Chance.  Albert suggests that the dynamics of the GRW interpretation of 
quantum mechanics might be able to account for thermodynamics.  The suggestion is that if 
GRW turns out to be a true theory, then its wave-function collapses might be the underlying 
cause of the entropy-increasing tendency of thermodynamic systems.  The argument in favor of 
this account, though, is not that it supplies the requisite causal mechanism which is missing from 
Boltzmann’s story.  The contention, rather, is that a GRW-based statistical mechanics can 
provide a better account of our thermodynamic experience.   
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This is because a Boltzmannian statistical mechanics (on any interpretation of quantum 
mechanics other than GRW) will require two kinds of fundamental probability laws, the uniform 
probability distribution over initial wave functions plus the quantum-mechanical probabilities.  
The former is needed in order to ground thermodynamic asymmetry, since if a system were to 
begin in an abnormal microstate, the deterministic equations which govern the evolution of its 
wave function would entail that it would evolve to as to decrease in entropy.  Hence the need for 
a probability distribution over initial wave functions in order to make it overwhelmingly unlikely 
that a system ever begins in an abnormal microstate in the first place.   
A GRW-based statistical mechanics does away with this probability distribution.  On this 
theory, it is the probability per unit time of a wave-function collapse, not an initial distribution 
over possible microstates, which results in the overwhelmingly high probability of entropy 
increase with which we are familiar.  Here there is no need for the Boltzmannian distribution 
over phase space since no matter which micrsotate among those compatible with its macrostate a 
system starts out in, GRW’s dynamics entail that it is overwhelmingly likely to evolve in accord 
with the second law of thermodynamics.  The GRW account thus requires only one fundamental 
probability law: the statistical-mechanical probabilities just are the quantum-mechanical 
probabilities.  This is therefore a simpler, more unified theory of thermodynamics; hence, ceteris 
paribus, it is preferable to the Boltzmannian one. 
Of course, the very possibility of such an account depends on the truth of GRW as an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  It must also be shown that a GRW-based statistical 
mechanics is capable of reproducing the (empirically confirmed) probabilistic predictions 
yielded by the Boltzmannian measure over phase space.3  One might have legitimate concerns 
                                                 
3 See Albert ([2000], pp. 155-159) for why it seems a GRW-based statistical mechanics should be able to do this. 
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about whether GRW can satisfy either of these requirements and, so, about whether it is capable 
of grounding thermodynamics.  Price, however, never indicates that he has any doubts about the 
empirical adequacy of this account; and his attack on the theory’s causal claims does not impinge 
on this assessment.  Indeed, as long as we are able to demonstrate that GRW is true of our world 
and that it yields the overwhelmingly high probability of our entropy-increasing experience, one 
wonders what more we need in order to reasonably conclude that it is the cause of that 
experience.  In any case, since our concern is with finding the right theory of thermodynamics, 
not with evaluating what such a theory might have to say about the underlying causal structure of 
the world (which would be an interesting question once we have the correct theory in hand), the 
objections Price raises are not relevant. 
Price thinks his ‘counterfactual containment problem’ reveals that even if GRW were true 
of our world, we still would have no reason to believe that it is responsible for the observed 
thermodynamic regularity.  Although we now see that this is a misleading way of framing the 
debate, it is worth examining why this argument fails.   
Price is correct that Causal-General solutions are committed to some kind of 
counterfactual claim.  But he is wrong about which claim they must satisfy; and the 
counterfactual they are committed to is justifiable.  For suppose there is some causal mechanism 
underlying entropy increase.  These accounts do not have to hold that if it were not for this 
mechanism—if it were to fail in some system—that system would occupy an abnormal 
microstate.  Rather, they are committed to a claim such as the following: if the mechanism they 
propose is what is responsible for the observed entropy-increasing tendency of thermodynamic 
systems, then if this mechanism were to fail in a given system, we simply would not expect the 
system to exhibit this tendency.  And (as Price himself notes) not expecting a system to behave 
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with an entropy-increasing tendency does not mean we must expect it to behave with an entropy-
decreasing tendency. 
Return to the GRW proposal.  Consider a system for which GRW does not predict a 
collapse, such as a tiny isolated gas on the order of 105 particles.  A GRW-based statistical 
mechanics must contend that this gas will not behave with the law-like increase in entropy we 
observe of systems in which a collapse does occur.4  But this does not mean the account is 
committed to this system’s behaving abnormally.  The GRW account, remember, does away with 
the Boltzmannian probability distribution over microstates: there is no statistical claim to tell us 
that the probability of a system’s occupying an abnormal microstate at a time is extremely small.  
Therefore, if a collapse fails to occur in some system, how that system behaves will depend on 
which microstate it happens to start out in; and some of these microstates, in the absence of a 
collapse, will lead to entropy decrease; but some of them will not.  And without the natural 
measure over phase space, there is no way of saying how likely either result is.5  This may strike 
us as counter-intuitive: we might assume, as Price does, that any gas must expand to fill its 
container.  But it is important to keep in mind that this assumption is based on the experience we 
have had so far, and that we have not yet had any experience of such tiny systems.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine how we could ever experience such a tiny gas: once we interact with it, after 
all, it will no longer be the tiny isolated system it must be in order for GRW to predict the failure 
                                                 
4 Note that this is on the assumption that the gas has been isolated for a long time; otherwise, we can appeal to 
collapses which occurred in the system’s past in order to conclude that it will behave normally. Here I address the 
most problematic case for the GRW account.  
5 Price takes this result to be in his favor: ‘Without some basis on which to say what would happen in the 
counterfactual case, the best that can be achieved is a kind of agnosticism about the effects of the mechanism in 
question—the view that we simply can’t say whether it makes a difference.  Clearly, this agnosticism falls short of a 
positive commitment to the view that the GRW mechanism is causally responsible for the phenomena in question’ 
([2002], p. 52 n. 18).  But this agnosticism is precisely what the theory should yield, for this is the correct claim that 
the account is committed to. 
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of a collapse.  So it might just be the case that these systems do not tend to increase in entropy, 
as a GRW-based thermodynamics would predict. 
In short, this theory claims that the GRW jumps are responsible for the thermodynamic 
regularities we observe.  In order to be able to conclude that these jumps are so responsible, then, 
all the Generalist needs to establish is that in their absence there will be no such reliable 
thermodynamic regularities—not that there will be an entropy-decreasing regularity.  And a 
GRW-based statistical mechanics, in eliminating the Boltzmann distribution, gives this result.  
Price, of course, maintains there can be no reason to expect a system to behave any differently 
without the alleged causal factor.  But if GRW turns out to be a true theory, then this is precisely 
what we should expect—and with good reason, namely, that this is how the true theory of our 
world says such a system will behave.  Empirical evidence of the truth GRW, in other words, is 
what would justify the (correctly formulated) counterfactual this account is committed to.  And 
since the very possibility of a GRW-based statistical mechanics hinges on the truth of the GRW 
theory, this is not at all problematic for the view.6   
                                                 
6 It might be worth working through Price’s counterfactual a little more carefully.  There are two other situations 
Price might have in mind: (1) GRW is true of our world, and the collapse mechanism is suddenly turned off in some 
system; or (2) the collapse mechanism is turned off at the initial state of the universe.  Neither case, however, is 
problematic for the GRW account. 
   Suppose the GRW mechanism is in place, and that it is now turned off in, say, a cup of ice.  According to Price, in 
order to conclude the collapses are responsible for the entropy-increasing behavior we had observed, this system 
must now exhibit abnormal behavior: the ice must begin to re-freeze, or melt at a different rate.  And since the ice is 
overwhelmingly likely to continue to melt (and at the rate we expect), Price will conclude that the jumps could not 
have been responsible for its normal behavior: remove the alleged cause, and we have the same effect.  Contra 
Price, however, this system’s behavior is due to GRW.  For the collapses which occurred in the system’s past render 
it overwhelmingly likely to be on a normal trajectory when the mechanism is turned off, and thus overwhelmingly 
likely at that time to evolve, deterministically, into a macrocondition with the higher entropy we expect. 
   Now consider turning off the jumps at the initial state of the universe.  Suppose we employ a means of evaluating 
counterfactuals such as that of David Lewis [1986], and suppose the closest possible world is one with the same 
macrostate.  The behavior of this world will depend on which microstate it happens to be in when the GRW 
mechanism is removed.  There are two possibilities.  It might occupy an abnormal microstate, and so exhibit 
abnormal behavior.  Or it might be in a normal microstate, and thus exhibit a law-like tendency to increase in 
entropy: thermodynamics will be true of this world and, moreover, may be accounted for by a Boltzmannian theory.  
But there is no way to determine, a priori, the likelihood of either result, for the Boltzmannian distribution over 
initial microstates can not be assumed to hold in this world—not until we have empirical confirmation that it does.  
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In arguing that nothing, not even the truth of GRW, could allow us to expect different 
thermodynamic behavior in the absence of an alleged cause, Price is supposing that we can never 
have reason to believe a system will behave other than how Boltzmannian statistical 
considerations tell us it will behave.  This view, however, relies on a mistaken conception of the 
status of the probabilities which factor into the Boltzmannian account, for it assumes that the 
Boltzmannian measure over microstates always holds—regardless of how the world turns out to 
be in the counterfactual case in which there is a causal mechanism for entropy increase.  Price, in 
other words, is assuming that the uniform distribution over the region of phase space 
corresponding to all the microconditions compatible with a system’s macrocondition holds a 
priori.7  But the uniform distribution over microstates, if it holds, is an empirical fact about the 
way our world happens to be; it is not an a priori truth which can be assumed to hold in any 
imagined case.  And so it must be empirically confirmed in order for us to be justified in 
imposing it on a system’s phase space.  After all, there is no unique way of placing measures on 
continuously infinite sets like the set of microconditions compatible with a given 
macrocondition: there are (infinitely) many ways of assigning sizes to continuously infinite sets 
of points.  It just so happens that one of these measures, the one where the size of such a set is 
                                                                                                                                                             
Whether thermodynamics is true in this case thus depends in the world’s initial state.  Price will conclude that 
positing GRW as the cause of thermodynamics in our world is unnecessary: all our world needs is the right kind of 
initial state.  However, even the case in which a Boltzmannian world results when the collapse mechanism fails does 
not prove that GRW is irrelevant thermodynamics.  All this shows is that if GRW actually causes such behavior, 
then in its absence something else might cause it instead; i.e., this is simply a case of causal overdetermination, and 
in such cases, a failure of counterfactual dependence does not mean a lack of causal relation.  
   (We might suppose instead that the closest world is one with the same laws.  If the GRW jumps are removed at the 
beginning, then the law of this world will be the Schrödinger equation [plus, perhaps, the initial low-entropy 
macrocondition].  But this world must display abnormal thermodynamic behavior; otherwise, it would have other 
laws [at least on an account such as Lewis’] which, by stipulation, it does not have.  Thus this case satisfies Price’s 
counterfactual.) 
   My thanks to David Albert for pointing out these extra details.    
7 Price seems to want to avoid this reproach, insisting that, ‘I am taking no particular stand on the nature and origins 
of the probabilities involved in Boltzmann’s account’ ([2002], p. 15). But he needs to treat the Boltzmannian 
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determined by the standardly-calculated volume of the region of phase space it occupies, yields 
the right empirical predictions.  This empirical confirmation is what justifies our using this 
measure. 
Price, we have seen, thinks we must rely on ‘our epistemic probabilities’ ([2002], p. 29) 
when evaluating the counterfactual case.  So it seems that he would respond to the above 
criticism by saying that we should assume a uniform distribution because we do not know which 
microstate actually obtains and, all things being equal, we ought to assign equal probability to 
each possible microstate.  But this response fails, for it relies on a principle of indifference 
according to which equipossible cases have the same probability, where equipossibility is 
determined via symmetry considerations based on our epistemic situation.  And the principle of 
indifference can not be used to determine the probabilities of empirical outcomes.  This is 
because, firstly, it assigns different probabilities to outcomes depending on the parameters with 
which we describe a situation.  Moreover, it is entirely contingent whether the probabilities we 
assign on the basis of a priori symmetry considerations will match the actual frequencies with 
which outcomes occur.  It is true that the uniform distribution seems remarkably simple or 
‘natural’; we might suspect that these features are what justify our imposing it on a system’s 
phase space.  But this simply is not the case.  As Bas Van Fraassen has put it, ‘there is no a priori 
reason why all [natural] phenomena should fit models with such “nice” properties only’ ([1989], 
p. 317).  Therefore, whenever the uniform distiribution does accord with the empirical 
phenomena, this is an a posteriori fact about the way our world happens to be. 
The Boltzmannian measure over phase space, in other words, is a contingent, scientific 
fact which yields the right empirical predictions; the Boltzmannian probabilities are neither 
                                                                                                                                                             
measure as a priori in order to argue that the Generalist has no reason to expect different behavior in the absence of 
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epistemic nor a priori.  This is why, pace Price, it is not pointless to posit an underlying cause of 
entropy increase even if statistical reasoning leads us to expect such behavior: we can not rely on 
statistical reasoning alone in order to rule out a causal explanation of thermodynamic behavior, 
because a causal mechanism might turn out to be the reason why the behavior we observe 
happens to conform to such reasoning.  Thus, Price is correct that there is a distinction among 
solutions based on whether they employ one or two time-asymmetric elements in order to 
account for thermodynamics; and in the end we may need only one asymmetry in order to do so.  
Nevertheless, whatever antecedent preference we might have for a one-asymmetry view can not 
on its own decide in favor of this solution; for empirical evidence might reveal a two-asymmetry 
account to be the correct one.    
This also suggests why Price’s discussion about the contrast class to thermodynamic 
asymmetry is misleading.  It may be that the Generalist and Particularist differ as to what a world 
without thermodynamic asymmetry would look like.  Nonetheless, antecedent considerations of 
what the proper contrast class is—whether it is the existence of entropy gradients which slope in 
both directions or no entropy gradient at all—can not motivate one kind of solution over the 
other without begging the question at issue.  For what a world would look like if there were not 
the thermodynamic asymmetry we observe depends on what in fact accounts for entropy increase 
in our world.  If, contra Price, there is a mechanism underlying this behavior in our world, then 
what would happen in its absence depends on the nature of this mechanism.  Until we have a 
solution to the problem, that is, all we know about a thermodynamically symmetric world is that 
things would not behave with the law-like increase in entropy of our world; whether this 
                                                                                                                                                             
the proposed mechanism.  
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amounts to no entropy gradient or to a mixture of gradients depends on what turns out to be 
responsible for the asymmetry of our world. 
Price acknowledges the complaint that he treats the statistical-mechanical probabilities as 
epistemic, thereby allowing the state of our knowledge to factor into what, it seems, should be a 
wholly objective scientific explanation.  Against this charge, he argues that the probabilities in 
his account are properly epistemic, for they do not do any causal or explanatory work; rather, 
they serve to alter what needs explaining.  He writes: ‘[T]here is a quite different role that 
probabilities can play in explanatory contexts, other than that of providing causes: viz., that of 
guiding our judgments as to what is “anomalous”—what calls for causal explanation, and what 
merely needs to be “normalised” (or given a normalising explanation […])’ ([2002], p. 28).  
Price concludes that we do not need objective probabilities in an explanation of thermodynamic 
asymmetry.  What is more, he says, any argument to the contrary will presuppose that we want a 
causal rather than a normalizing explanation, thus begging the very question at issue.   
 Now we can understand why Price’s claim that the Boltzmannian account offers a 
“normalising explanation” for entropy increase seems confused.  According to Price, the second 
law of thermodynamics is explained by noting that the natural measure, in counting the number 
of normal microstates as overwhelmingly large, renders entropy-increasing behavior 
overwhelmingly statistically likely.  Price thus argues from the ‘natural epistemic measure’ to the 
conclusion that entropy-increasing behavior is ‘typical’ and so not in need of explanation.  But 
the reason we use this ‘natural measure’ in the first place is precisely that it counts the behavior 
we observe as overwhelmingly likely or ‘typical.’  As we’ve seen, these statistical considerations 
are not justified on a priori or epistemic grounds.  We impose the natural distribution, then, 
simply because it renders the thermodynamic features of our experience overwhelmingly 
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probable; hence our experience of macroscopic systems suggests that this is how 
microconditions are actually distributed in nature.  Thus, we begin with the empirical data of 
entropy increase and then use this to justify our imposing the uniform distribution on a system’s 
phase space.  Price’s claim that we have a normalizing explanation for entropy increase thus 
seems to amount to no more than the claim that the natural measure over microstates is 
empirically confirmed by our entropy-increasing experience. 
More generally, Price suggests that the only phenomena science needs to explain are the 
statistically anomalous ones, since statistically normal phenomena are explained via statistical 
considerations alone.  On his view, therefore, it does not make sense to ask, ‘Why does a gas 
expand to fill its container?’, given that (allegedly) a priori statistical reasoning has shown us to 
expect such behavior.  Contra Price, however, all empirical phenomena—even the statistically 
normal ones—call for explanation, as far as science is concerned.  Surely science aims—and 
surely it should aim—to explain the frequently occurring phenomena just as much as it tries to 
explain the seemingly anomalous ones.  The fact that entropy increase isn’t statistically 
extraordinary, e.g., is an empirical fact about the world and, accordingly, is something which 
science should try to explain—and does try to explain, via the Boltzmannian account.  Price’s 
suggestion that things require explanation only if they fail to exhibit statistically probable 
behavior is therefore misleading, for we can not determine what something’s natural condition is 
in the absence of an empirical theory which, in turn, serves as a scientific explanation for that 
condition’s being considered the natural one.  Thus, a gas’ expanding to fill its container is to be 
expected only given the empirically confirmed theory according to which the microstates of 
thermodynamic systems are distributed in the way the Boltzmannian account says.  Of course, in 
any account there must be some brute facts which do not require explanation in the way that 
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other facts which depend on the primitive ones do.  But the fact that thermodynamic systems 
behave with a law-like entropy-increasing tendency despite the symmetry of the underlying laws 
is surely something calling for explanation—as is any process or behavior we observe.  Indeed, 
the only thing for which science may not offer some sort of explanation, I would suggest, is the 
fact that certain initial conditions obtain or that certain fundamental laws happen to hold in our 
world.  (Price disagrees; I will return to this shortly.) 
Price will think I am begging the question in assuming there is a law-like generalization 
to account for in the first place.  For him, the law-like character of what we observe is in dispute.  
Indeed, the distinction he draws between one- and two-asymmetry views lies precisely in 
whether the view says there is a law-like asymmetry which needs explaining.  (Hence his 
suggestion that the requisite counterfactual is not whether there would be an entropy-increasing 
tendency in the absence of the proposed cause, but whether a system would increase in entropy.)   
But this seems to misunderstand the puzzle which the Boltzmannian account is trying to 
solve.  This solution does not deny that there is a law-like asymmetry to our experience; it simply 
denies that there is any asymmetric dynamical mechanism which gives rise to that experience.  
The problem, after all, is how to account for the widespread asymmetry of our experience in a 
world apparently governed by time-reversal invariant laws.  So we begin with the observed 
tendency of entropy to increase as an empirical feature of our experience, and thus as something 
which a scientific account should try to explain.  The Boltzmannian solution then says that the 
observed asymmetry results from asymmetric boundary conditions—not that there is no apparent 
asymmetry which needs explaining.  
Price’s reason for thinking the entropy-increasing generalization is not law-like is that it 
is not projectible.  As he notes, the Boltzmannian account can succeed only on the assumption 
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that entropy was extremely low at the initial state of the universe.  This, plus the fact that the 
Boltzmannian probabilities don’t preclude a low-entropy future boundary condition—since they 
do not preclude such a past condition—leads Price to conclude that we do not have reason to be 
confident that entropy will continue to increase until we understand more about the low-entropy 
past.  In Price’s terms, the probabilities of the Boltzmannian account have a ‘deferential status’ 
towards the past, leaving open the possibility that they might be similarly ‘trumped’ in the future.  
Therefore, the most we can say in forming a generalization about our thermodynamic experience 
is that entropy is likely to be high, ceteris paribus.   
Yet there seems to me to be pretty good reason to retain confidence in the belief that 
entropy will continue to increase.  First of all, a time-asymmetric theory such as GRW does rule 
out a future low-entropy boundary condition.  If GRW turns out to be the true theory of our 
world, then, we would have good reason to expect entropy to continue to increase.  What is 
more, this reason is independent of our understanding anything about the past.  (Indeed, GRW by 
itself does not tell us anything about the past.)8   
Even if GRW turns out not to be a true theory, Boltzmannian statistical considerations 
plus symmetric dynamical laws give us good reason to expect that entropy will increase in the 
future, for they tell us that this is what will happen with overwhelmingly high probability.  
Indeed, when combined with time-reversal invariant laws, Boltzmannian statistical 
considerations also render it overwhelmingly probable that entropy has increased towards the 
past: hence the need for a low-entropy initial boundary condition.  Thus, it is not as though the 
past low-entropy condition overrides the claims these considerations yield about the past, so that 
                                                 
8 Price maintains that ‘we are not justified in postulating such a [time-asymmetric] law, unless we have independent 
reason for excluding the possibility of a low entropy future’ ([2002], p. 53 n. 21). But surely experimental evidence 
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we can not trust their predictions about the future until we know whether they are similarly 
overridden in that direction.9  Rather, the past low-entropy condition serves to correct the 
empirically disconfirmed claims they make about the past.  Therefore, in the absence of any 
empirical evidence to suggest that the Boltzmannian statistical claims about the future are 
incorrect—and given the strong empirical evidence in favor this account—we have good reason 
to rely on its predictions.  It is true that the Boltzmannian story does not preclude the possibility 
of a low-entropy future boundary condition, and if we ever do obtain evidence of such a 
condition, we would have to alter our theory accordingly.  But this does not disrupt our 
overwhelmingly good grounds for thinking that entropy will continue to increase given the 
confirmation of those accounts which tell us that this is what will happen.  And these grounds are 
independent of what we know about the low-entropy past. 
Lastly, I want to briefly comment on Price’s view that the low-entropy initial state of the 
universe requires explanation because it is so statistically improbable.  Such an explanation, he 
says, would yield “’some sort of law-like narrowing of the space of possibilities, so that such a 
universe no longer counts as abnormal’ ([2002], p. 41).  Price thinks this is all we need in order 
to explain the asymmetry of thermodynamics in general.   
This understanding of the puzzle, however, stems from Price’s misconception of the 
status of the Boltzmannian probability measure: for him, the reason the second law of 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the truth of GRW would justify our postulating it as the theory of our world, in which case we would be justified 
in trusting its predictions. 
9 Indeed, the entire notion of probabilities which are trumped’ in one direction of time is strange. Price seems to 
think these probabilities are still out there in the world in the backwards direction of time even though they are only 
ever manifested in observable frequencies in the forwards direction. But surely any probabilities which appear in the 
fundamental laws must have something to do with the actual frequencies with which outcomes are observed to 
occur: if certain probabilities do not have anything to do with how things actually happen in the world, then they can 
not play any role in explaining its behavior, and so ought not to appear in its fundamental laws. Thus, if we do not 
see any law-like entropy-increasing behavior in the backwards direction of time, we should conclude that there are 
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thermodynamics does not require explanation is that supposedly a priori statistical considerations 
provide all the explanation we need.  This alone suffices to show that the puzzle about the time-
asymmetry of thermodynamics doesn’t reduce to that of explaining the initial condition of the 
universe.  Yet there are a few more considerations which reinforce the suggestion that Price’s 
aim is off the mark.  Firstly, it is not as clear as Price seems to think that global initial conditions 
can be explained in the way that he wants.  For Price, such an explanation would render initial 
smoothness statistically unexceptional or ‘normal.’  Given the aforementioned difficulties with 
the entire notion of a “’normalizing explanation’ of empirical phenomena, however, it remains 
unclear whether Price can achieve the explanation he seeks.  Indeed, according to some views, 
the initial low-entropy state should be regarded as a law of nature.  If correct, this would counter 
Price’s understanding of the time-asymmetric explanandum of thermodynamics, since granting 
the initial condition law-like status is tantamount to saying that it can not be further explained.  
Second, Price has not said enough in arguing against those who insist that global initial 
conditions can not be explained.  He writes that,  
[T]he proponent of [the] ‘no need to explain initial conditions’ view needs to tell us what 
is special about (what we call) initial conditions.  The threat here is a temporal double 
standard—an unjustified discrimination on the basis of temporal location or orientation 
([2002], p. 39).   
 
It is unclear, however, that there is an unjustified temporal bias at work here.  Craig Callender, 
for one, has suggested that the prevalence of successful explanations of events by appeal to laws 
plus earlier conditions might justify this temporal aspect of our explanations ([1998], pp. 151-
152).  If so, then the difference in temporal orientation could be a legitimate reason to conclude 
that initial conditions are special when it comes to scientific explanation.  Indeed, a general 
                                                                                                                                                             
no chances governing that behavior in this direction, not that they are still present but overridden. If we only ever see 
the effect of such chances in one time direction, what reason could we have for concluding they exist in the other?  
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difference in explanatory standards with respect to the past and the future could be justified by 
the scientific theory of our world.  GRW, for example, yields probabilistic predictions towards 
the future but no such claims about the past; so that if GRW is true, scientific explanations 
towards the future would differ from those towards the past in a way which does not rely on the 
kind of anthropocentric temporal bias Price criticizes.   (More generally, this kind of difference 
might be justified by the fact that our world has a low-entropy initial condition but no similar 
future condition.) 
Finally, even if we grant Price the prospect of explaining initial conditions in the way that 
he wants, it strikes me that his demand ought to lead him to prefer a proposal such as Albert’s.  
On the GRW theory, entropy increase is overwhelmingly likely for any microstate compatible 
with the universe’s initial low-entropy macrostate.  Albert’s account thus yields the observed 
entropy-increasing tendency for a wider range of initial conditions than the traditional 
Boltzmannian account does.  Thus, on the GRW proposal, it becomes less unlikely—less 
seemingly accidental—that the initial conditions of the universe were such as to generate 
behavior in accord with the second law of thermodynamics.  
 
Conclusion 
Let us recall the problem we started with.  We began by wondering why it is the case 
that, in a world supposedly governed by time-reversal invariant laws, there is such a widespread 
time-asymmetry to our experience.  The traditional approach assumes asymmetric boundary 
conditions.  The Causal-General approach, on the other hand, says that entropy never decreases 
because of some underlying causal mechanism.  
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Price thinks both these accounts miss the point, insofar as the time-asymmetry of 
thermodyanmics is concerned, since what needs to be explained is not why entropy increases but 
why entropy was low to begin with.  As we have seen, however, Price reaches this understanding 
of the problem on the basis of a misconception of the nature of the statistical-mechanical 
probabilities and of what needs to be explained in any scientific account of the world.  Moreover, 
his puzzle is different from the one we started out with—a puzzle which is answered quite nicely 
by a Causal-General solution such as Albert’s on which thermodynamics results from a 
fundamental dynamical law.  As they stand, therefore, both the (correctly understood) 
Boltzmannian solution and the Causal-General approach fail to answer Price’s problem.  But 
explaining the initial condition of the universe in the way that Price wants is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for explaining the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics.  And since entropy 
increase is something that calls for explanation, it seems that Price is the one who misconceives 
the problem.  
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